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Abstract
On the path to establishing a global cybersecurity framework where
each enterprise shares information about malicious behavior, an important
question arises. How can a machine learning representation characterizing
a cyber attack on one network be used to detect similar attacks on other
enterprise networks if each networks has wildly different distributions of
benign and malicious traffic? We address this issue by comparing the
results of naively transferring a model across network domains and using
CORrelation ALignment, to our novel adversarial Siamese neural network.
Our proposed model learns attack representations that are more invariant
to each network’s particularities via an adversarial approach. It uses a
simple ranking loss that prioritizes the labeling of the most egregious ma-
licious events correctly over average accuracy. This is appropriate for driv-
ing an alert triage workflow wherein an analyst only has time to inspect
the top few events ranked highest by the model. In terms of accuracy,
the other approaches fail completely to detect any malicious events when
models were trained on one dataset are evaluated on another for the first
100 events. While, the method presented here retrieves sizable propor-
tions of malicious events, at the expense of some training instabilities due
in adversarial modeling. We evaluate these approaches using 2 publicly
available networking datasets, and suggest areas for future research.
1 Introduction
The large differences in distributions of data from networks operating under
different conditions introduce challenges for frameworks aiming to learn attack
signatures globally across all networks. Global analysis involves the sharing of
models or information across one or more enterprises. If two or more enterprises
∗Corresponding author: Casey Kneale, ckneale@ccri.com
1
ar
X
iv
:1
90
7.
11
12
9v
1 
 [c
s.L
G]
  2
5 J
ul 
20
19
have data that are statistically similar, then the application of a single model
from either domain can be applied to the other typically with minor or no loss
in performance. When the domains are different, the context of a model then
depends upon the domain it was derived from. Ideally, the characterization of
cybersecurity threats with invariant representations would allow for universal
detection across enterprise networks. In this work we specifically address the
problem of context dependence for purposes of shared threat identification across
two exemplary domains.
We first show that network data collected from separate networks, enter-
prises, or at different times can be statistically different. These differences are
likely the result of different enterprises using different sets of networked services,
technological advances over time (Moore’s Law) [14], new attack vectors, and/or
different trends in end-user behavior. For example, one could anticipate that
network data that has been collected from a corporate network during work
hours would feature comparatively less streaming/social media, but potentially
more SMTP traffic than network data obtained from a university on a weekend.
These real world phenomena make it difficult to utilize academic datasets, or
data from other enterprises in global models.
What does an analyst want to experience when they bring a new system
online? Many working analysts make use of ticketing systems, where end users,
or other analysts, report problems in the form of a ticket. The recorded tickers
are later read and addressed via human intervention. An effective ticketing
system places tasks/threats that require priority to the top of a list so they are
addressed in a timely manner[13]. This type of security workflow is often referred
to as triage [23]. Triage reduces the time spent examining normal/mislabeled
network traffic, and large volumes of low priority risks, when another incident
with greater importance is reported.
In practice it is expensive for each new enterprise in a global framework
to create their own labeled datasets from scratch. This is because classification
and triage models can require hundreds, if not thousands, of malicious examples.
An approach to solving this problem found in the field of machine learning is
to make models context independent in the presence of interdomain variance,
so they can be transferred across domains[4, 19]. The goal of this study is to
demonstrate a proof of concept for how preexisting information from a labeled
network, can immediately be utilized for triage on a network with different data
distributions for which no events have been labeled.
For proof of concept we show that the transfer of a triage model which tar-
gets Denial of Service (DoS) attacks between either the UNSW NB-15 or the
CICIDS2017 datasets can be performed. DoS attacks were selected as a proof of
concept but also due to necessity; there is a concerning lack of publicly available
cyber security data which has similar class labels. Despite that it may seem triv-
ial to transfer a DoS detector because DoS has historically had a similar attack
vector across time [12] we show that minimal effort approaches fail to produce
useful transfers with internetwork variances present in the aforementioned data.
We demonstrate the efficacy of two approaches from the field of machine
learning for transductively transferring[16] a triage model from one academic
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dataset to another. The transfer methods we describe are performed in either
an unsupervised or semi-supervised manner, meaning that the class labels of
the domain receiving label information from the other is not accounted for in
the modeling. We also present a novel approach to assessing triage models
called Rolling TopN accuracy, and some useful metrics for training the mod-
els employed. Although the effort presented here is preliminary, and thereby
limited in scope, we show that for triage purposes, adversarial neural networks
offer a promising route to challenges inherent with domain transfers in context
dependent settings.
1.1 Related Work
Robust Representation for Domain Adaptation in Network Security [2] Machine
Learning in Cyber-Security Problems, Challenges and DataSets [1] Transfer
learning for detecting unknown network attacks [7]
2 Data
All data was preprocessed in the following way: quantiles for each variable were
clamped to be ≥ 0.001 and ≤ 0.999 before being range/min-max scaled. This
preprocessing was used to trim some of the long tails of the features employed
and place the data into a reasonable range for weight optimization via back
propagation. It is important to state that this preprocessing was performed
independently across domains, and only used information available from the re-
spective training sets when applied to hold out sets. Where supervised learning
was employed, only the first 80,000 samples of the dataset were considered to
be a training set, and the remaining samples to be the test set. This was done
to ensure a realistic scenario where a new network is being brought online and
temporal order is maintained.
2.1 UNSW NB-15
The UNSW NB-15 dataset was collected in 2015 by a semisynthetic network [15].
The network was composed of artificial traffic generated by the IXIA perfect
storm tool and traffic generated by several human users across a fire-wall. It
features 9 attack categories, and is available in several formats (PCAP, BRO,
CSV). The CSV datasets were used for convenience. The class balance in the
for DoS to normal traffic is approximately 1:19 and 1:13 for the train and test
sets respectively. Please note, the other 8 attack classes in this data were pooled
into a ’normal’ traffic label to mimic the conditions of having mostly unlabeled
network data.
2.2 CICIDS2017
The CICIDS2017 dataset was collected 2 years after the UNSW NB-15 data.
The collection took place for a week. On each day attacks such as: Brute
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Force FTP, Brute Force SSH, DoS, Heartbleed, Web Attack, Infiltration, Botnet
and DDoS were conducted. For this study we used the DoS attacks from the
“Wednesday” and Distributed DoS (DDoS) attacks in the “Friday” subsets. A
detailed list of the DoS and DDoS attacks present on these subsets is provided
in table. The prevalence of DoS network activity relative to normal activity on
the Wednesday subset was 1:1.76 and the Friday subset had slightly more than
1:1. For more information about the network topology and experimental design,
please see the original reference [17].
Wednesday Friday
DoS slowloris, DoS Slowhttptest, DDoS LOIT, Botnet ARES
DoS Hulk, DoS GoldenEye -
Table 1: Different DoS and DDoS attacks conducted on Wednesday and Friday
of the CICIDS2017 dataset.
2.3 Feature Engineering
In their native forms only a few features between both datasets are shared
(IE: UNSW NB-15’s ”dur” and CICIDS2017’s ”Flow Duration”). The following
7 column labels available form the UNSW NB-15 CSV dataset: dur, spkts,
dpkts, load, rate, sinpkt, and dinpkt, were calculated/obtained from available
features in the CICIDS2017 dataset. Aside from dimensional analysis no further
engineering was performed.
3 Methods
3.1 CORAL
CORrelation ALignment, or CORAL, is a simple domain adaptation method of-
ten used in the field of transfer learning. The objective function used in CORAL
minimizes the Frobenius norm of the differences between two domains’ (A & B)
covariance matrices(CA & CB) by solving for some transfer matrix T such that
||TTCAT − CB ||F is minimal. As suggested in the original publication the
transfer matrix can be obtained via whitening the source covariance matrix and
recoloring with the target covariance in 4 lines of linear algebra supported code.
This method is attractive because it is independent of sample correspondences
across domains because it seeks to map the second order statistics of the two
domains[19]. The alignment of similar samples does not need to be performed.
3.2 Adversarial Neural Networks
Adversarial neural networks (AN) are composed of at least one primary network
trained to perform the task at hand (Ie: classification / ranking) and at least one
adversarial network which challenges the primary network. The sub-network or
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external adversarial network is typically trained on an auxiliary but related task
to generalize the results which would otherwise be obtained from being trained
solely on the primary task. This type of training can be seen as a zero sum
game where one network is poised to minimize it’s modeling loss (LP ) but the
other is poised to maximize the error in the primary task (LA). Loss functions
of this variety have the following general form:
Loss = max(min(LP )− LA) (1)
Many AN’s, especially generative adversarial networks, are composed of two
models which do not share weights[6]. In our hands we have found those mod-
els difficult to train. Instead, a trending approach commonly used in transfer
learning tasks is to share weights with-in the model and build separate outputs
or heads for the primary and adversarial tasks [4, 5].
Our network consisted of three basic units, the first is a feed-forward neural
network chain which creates an embedded representation of the input data(E),
a ListMLE [21] subnetwork which ranks netflows by their label (Ie: Normal →
DoS) (L) and an adversarial Siamese subnetwork which attempts to discriminate
between CICIDS2017 and UNSW NB-15 flows(D). This generic structure is
depicted by Figure 1, and each output/head is described below.
Figure 1: Adversarial Neural Network topology.
3.3 ListMLE
ListMLE neural networks are neural networks that do not expressly perform a
classification or regression task. Instead ListMLE learns rankings of observa-
tions based on their features in a supervised manner. This goal coincides well
with the idea of threat triage, in that certain malicious behaviors should take
precedence over others for human diagnosis / intervention.
In this work N training observations resulted from the concatenation of
DoS and normal classes (1:1). The elements of the list ranking vector(y) were
calculated for each batch using the following expression: yi = i/N . This ranking
implies that a value of 0.0 corresponded to an exemplary DoS, at 0.5 the first
normal flow was observed, and at 1.0 the final normal observation had been
presented. The loss function ListMLE models employ optimizes the Plackett-
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Luce likelihood that the predicted ranking scores follow in the assigned order,
LossListMLE(L(x), y) = −
N∑
i=1
ln
(
exp(L(xi))∑
k|yk>yi exp(L(xk))
)
Here, {yi} are the labels that capture the desired ordering of the list. Nu-
meric stability and performance issues can be observed when the number of
items in the list are large. One way to avoid this problem is to consider only the
top n samples. This approach has been shown to be statistically consistent [22].
Our model utilized only the top 150 items during training. Another advantage
is that Siamese networks scale well to large numbers of classes / domains /
enterprises.
3.4 Siamese Neural Network
Siamese neural networks [3] are composed of 2 copies of the same embedding
network, which is trained to learn a mapping of its inputs such that the square
euclidean distances (d) between its outputs are discriminative. In our use-case,
the domains / enterprise networks that the observations came from(XA & XB),
are treated as labels. Pairs of observations from the same domain are assigned a
ground truth label of Y = 0, otherwise the pair’s label is Y = 1. In our work, we
chose to use a contrastive loss function, with a margin hyperparameter (m = 2.),
as is commonly done[3]. The margin serves to pushes the mappings of pairs of
inputs from different classes to be at least m distance units apart, but penalize
model weights for pairs from different domains whose mappings are already
more than m apart from each other:
Losscontrastive = 0.5 ∗ ((1− Y ) ∗ d + Y ∗max(0,m− d))
Siamese networks have potential advantages when compared to traditional
feed forward neural network models. One advantage that can be leveraged for
transfer learning, is the ability to learn new class representations with relatively
few examples. This modeling regime is referred to as few shot learning, or one
shot learning when only one example for a given class is available [8]. This is an
attractive attribute for transfer learning tasks, because the labeling of samples
can be comparatively expensive. Another advantage is that Siamese networks
scale well to large numbers of classes / domains / enterprises.
3.5 Adversarial Training
The loss functions employed to train the overall adversarial network described
in Equation 1 can be related to both the list-wise ranking(LL) and Siamese
discriminator (LD) by the following expressions:
LP = LL = LossListMLE
LA = LD = Losscontrastive
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Although these two loss functions clearly describe the primary and adversarial
goals of the network, they do not explicitly describe how the model was trained.
The model weight updates were calculated from two separate pools of shuffled
data per iteration. Although it is common for adversarial models to employ
independent stochastic gradient descent/ascent updates for each subnetwork,
we did not update weights until after all computations were performed. The
gradients which are attributable from the X → E → L networks were calculated
by backpropagation using gradient descent as usual.
However, the gradient updates from X → E → D were computed via gra-
dient ascent. The gradients from X → E had their direction inverted by multi-
plying by a scalar factor of −1. This approach is sometimes referred to as the
ReverseGrad algorithm [4], and it is what allows the discriminator to effect the
classification head’s loss (LL) in an adversarial way.
3.6 Topology
Commonly described adversarial models, such as those in the field of computer
vision, are typically complicated and bolster large numbers of neurons/floating
point operations. Only a simple topology was considered for the model used in
our experiments despite that better network topologies likely exist,
Subnetwork Topology
E 11σ, 10σ, 9σ, 7σ, 7σ
L 14σ, 1L
D ||E(XA)− E(XB)||2
Table 2: Topology for the adversarial neural network model used in this study.
The tuning of semisupervised neural networks can only be done for the su-
pervised domain. Estimating which architecture transfers adequately across
domains is limited to statistical metrics that have been described in the Train-
ing Considerations subsection. The authors do not attempt to make claims of
optimality.
4 Results and Discussion
4.1 Comparison of Source Distributions
The Kuiper test is robust nonparametric statistical test that can be used to
assesses whether or not a sample and a reference distribution are equivalent [9].
To ensure that the feature space between UNSW NB-15 and CICIDS2017 were
statistically different the Kuiper test was used to compare the individual feature
distributions from both training subsets (80,000 examples each). The test was
conducted without binning or discretizing the observations. The cumulative
distribution functions were calculated by sorting the pool of samples from both
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domains across features. It was found that all of the p values obtained from
independently comparing the feature distributions across domains were zero
and that each domains’ features were statistically different from one another.
For clarity it is important to explicitly state the directionality of the hypothe-
sis test that was employed. The hypothesis was posed such that at a significance
level of 0.05, for two distributions to be similar, according the Kuiper statistic, a
p value should be greater then 0.95. Visually the differences between the quan-
tile trimmed and range normalized feature distributions can be seen in Figure
2.
Figure 2: A truncated violin plot of the kernel density estimated feature dis-
tributions (bins = 1,000, N = 80,000). The long tails of the distributions were
truncated for visualization purposes so that only the smallest 5% of values are
displayed.
An empirical test where a K-Nearest Neighbors (K-NN) classification model
was transferred from UNSW NB-15 to the CICIDS2017 ‘Friday’ subset. This
test was performed to confirm that the inter-domain feature distributions were
not likely well represented by one another in terms of magnitude or localiza-
tion. K-NN was selected because K-NN classification models have the ability
to learn challenging nonlinear class boundaries for low dimensional problems
and offer the statistical guarantee that the Bayes error rate for K-NN models
incorporating only 1 nearest neighbor can not be more than 1/2 the model error
when sufficient samples are present. Most importantly, K-NN classifies entries
based on the distance between an unknown point and a memory store of labeled
samples. Thus, if the normal and DoS representations were similar across do-
mains then K-NN modeling efficacy should also be transferable across domains
to some extent. An approximate ball-tree K-NN algorithm to handle the large
number of samples available in either distribution with little consequence to the
K-NN classification mechanism [10]. The results of this experiment are shown
in Table 2.
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Transfer Method CICIDS2017 Train CICIDS2017 Test
Control 1.0 0.966
No Transfer 0.445 0.432
CORAL 0.566 0.578
Table 3: F-Measures of 1-NN models transferred from UNSW NB-15 to CI-
CIDS2017.
It was found that neither of the transfers offered results which were nearly
as effective as the control (training and testing on CICIDS2017 data). Without
adapting the CICIDS2017 domain to that of UNSW NB-15 the 1-NN model
afforded F measures which were not satisfactory given the class balance of the
CICIDS2017 train (1 : 1.3) and test sets (1 : 1.3). Ultimately, both the no
transfer trial and the CORAL transfers can be seen as scoring about as well as
the no information rate for either class proportion (1/2.3 and 1.3/2.3). These
findings coincide with the hypothesis that the domains have different represen-
tations of their class labels despite having semantically similar features. These
results were somewhat unexpected. In our hands CORAL has been a compet-
itive domain transfer method for other types of data, and many DoS attack
vectors are known present similarly to one another [12].
The evidence gathered from the aforementioned experiments suggested that
transferring DoS attacks from these two academic datasets is not a trivial
task because the two domains do not natively share similar class represen-
tations. The feature distributions were statistically different, and even with
scaled/normalized features the CORAL method failed to produce classification
based domain transfers above the no information rate. These results encouraged
revisiting the problem statement and focusing on what an ideal result might look
like.
4.2 Transfer of Triage Models
What should an analyst experience when they bring a new system online? For
an analyst to be most effective the first few items presented in a ticketing system
should be of high priority for action [23]. This is somewhat contrary to how
many machine learning approaches phrase the problem of cyber security as one
of classification. Not every classification method readily supports triage. For
example, K-NN with 1 nearest neighbor does not directly suggest how well a
sample fits into a class label unless a heuristic based on sample-to-class distance
is imposed such as what is done in Probabilistic Neural Networks [18].
A neural network architecture that was readily amenable to triage and ad-
versarial learning methods was investigated. In order to assess the efficacy of
triage models generated we introduce a plot called the Rolling TopN Accuracy
plot. The plot is generated by sorting the prediction vector in descending order
and at every location in the abscissa the number of true malicious entries (M)
observed is divided by the number of samples scored (N) is calculated. This
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measure can be expressed as the following,
RollingTopN =
∑
N C
N
, C ∈
(
1, if Class of Interest
0, else
)
Each point on the plot is a score between 0-1, and the plot describes how often
samples labeled to be of high priority (left-most) were actually the correct class
label/priority level. For example, if the first 100 highest scoring samples ranked
by the model, are not DoS, the scores for the first 100 samples will be 0%.
The Rolling TopN analysis was first conducted on 10 replicates of the ad-
versarial transfer and 100 replicates for both control transfer methods from the
UNSW NB-15 DoS dataset to the CICIDS2017 ”Wednesday” subset. CORAL
and training a model without the adversarial component (Naive) were again
used as a controls. It was found that, the adversarial method outperformed
both, especially in the first ≈ 1/3 of samples analyzed. This finding suggested
that the adversarial approach can improve domain representations for trans-
fer learning tasks of net flow data. For triage purposes the Top100 predicted
samples were also analyzed (Figure 2). It was found that, although the adver-
sarial model did not, on average, provide high scores with > 50.% accuracy the
method did, on average, perform better then the lower bound(0.%); a feat the
other methods failed to do.
Figure 3: 10 replicates for the Rolling TopN and Top100 Accuracy of the adver-
sarial transfer of UNSW NB-15 DoS to CICIDS2017 ”Friday” DoS data. The
naive transfer and CORAL transfers were individually performed with 100 repli-
cates. 1 sigma error bars are displayed with a shadow, and the upper and lower
bounds for perfect and worse case results are displayed with dashed lines.
Next the transfer from CICIDS2017’s ”Wednesday” DoS subset to UNSW
NB-15 DoS was considered. Again, the rolling Top100 accuracies outperformed
the control methods (Figure 3). The accuracy across N samples for the control
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methods were effectively equal to the lower bound for the Top100 samples;
meaning they did not, on average, provide usable rankings. This result provided
further evidence that suggested the adversarial network approach tended to
adapt the class representations across domains. However, the Rolling TopN
Accuracy scores going from CICIDS2017’s ”Wednesday”→ UNSW NB-15, were
comparatively lower than the transfer from UNSW NB-15 → ”Wednesday”.
Figure 4: 10 replicates for the Rolling TopN and Top100 Accuracy of the trans-
fer trials for transferring CICIDS2017 ”Friday” DDoS to UNSW NB-15 DoS
attacks. 1 sigma error bars are displayed with a shadow, and the upper and
lower bounds for perfect and worse case results are displayed with dashed lines.
The success of this transfer lead to questioning whether or not DDoS and
DoS detector models could be transferred between one another. To assess this,
the transfers both to and from CICIDS2017’s ”Friday” DDoS subset and the
UNSW NB-15 DoS data were considered (Figure 4). Again, the transfer from
CICIDS2017 to UNSW-NB 15 tended to have higher scores then the transfer
from UNSW-NB 15 to CICIDS2017. Over-all the accuracies obtained from the
adversarial transfers using the ”Friday” subset tended to be lower in magni-
tude than that of the ”Wednesday” subset. This finding is reasonable, because
several types of DoS attacks(volume, protocol, application layer) share similar
characteristics with DDoS attacks, however, they are do not necessarily present
in the same way because of different vectors. Although the adversarial approach
more adequately find invariant representations between both domains than the
control methods, it was not without technical shortcomings.
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Figure 5: 10 replicates for the Rolling TopN and Top100 accuracies of the trans-
fer trials for transferring both to and from the CICIDS2017 ”Wednesday” DDoS
subset and the UNSW NB-15 DoS dataset. 1 sigma error bars are displayed with
a shadow, and the upper and lower bounds for perfect and worse case results
are displayed with dashed lines.
4.3 Training Considerations
Training neural networks can be a difficult task because they inherently possess
ambiguity in the selection of topologies and values for hyperparameters. Fur-
thermore, training adversarial neural networks adds additional challenges, in
that they can be unstable [20], not converge [11], and exhibit otherwise unex-
pected behavior. Our interests were primarily concerned with adapting domains
from a labeled dataset to another dataset which does not have labels. This
problem statement, unfortunately, complicated matters further. The question
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of whether or not a model successfully learned the auxiliary domain becomes
pertinent, and to our knowledge, is intractable to answer.
Despite that the problem has no rigorous solution we found several metrics
to be address the efficacy of the model presented. Perhaps most importantly is
the question of whether or not the Siamese embedding(E(X)) is infact making a
representation where both domains(A & B) are similar statistically. One metric,
the congruence measure, describes the difference between the column-wise(u ∈
1, 2, ..., U) quantiles of the embedded representations from both domains:
CMc(XA, XB) =
U∑
u=1
(Pr(XA.u ≤ c)− Pr(XB,u ≤ c))2 (2)
By monitoring discrepancies between a suitable range of quantiles(Ie: c =
0.1, 0.2, ..., 0.9) one can determine if over-all, the distributions from E(XA) or
E(XB) are decreasing(becoming more similar), or if the modeling is driving
certain quantiles apart with respect to training iterations. Figure 4 shows are
examples of healthy and unhealthy training plots with respect to 9 quantile
differences,
Figure 6: Plots of the congruence measure during training for a model that
is bringing quantiles closer together(above) and an model which is tending to
drive quantiles further apart(below). Each line represents a different quantile.
Although the predictive efficacy of the model on the auxiliary domain cannot
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be directly assessed, another important assumption is that, the learned embed-
ding still performs well on the domain with labels. This can be easily checked
by monitoring a TopN plot on the training or a holdout set. Similarly, the
typical training statistics (minimum/maximum weight values, ranks of weights,
etc) should also be used to ensure the network is healthy as usual. One interest-
ing thing to note is that the ListMLE loss can behave erratically when used in
an adversarial setting. It is advisable to ensure that the loss follows a smooth
pattern and does not have artifacts from local minima. By ensuring that the
loss on the supervised domain for the ListMLE subnetwork is providing stable
results, and that the quantiles smoothly decrease in value, one can posit that
the method performed domain adaptation. It should be stated that with the
current task, selected topology, and data used in this study to acquire 10 results
that contributed to the Rolling TopN plots, approximately 40 results which did
not match these criteria were discarded for either transfer.
Figure 7: Plots of the ListMLE loss during training for the same models shown
in Figure 5. The top plot displays a stable loss gradually decaying in variance
and the bottom most plot shows a loss plot possibly caught in a local minima
where changes in the adversarial layer are leading to unstable behavior (below).
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4.4 Conclusion
It was shown that the UNSW NB-15, and CICIDS2017 datasets have contribu-
tions of variance in at least 7 features that make the modeling of DoS attacks
difficult to transfer. The problem seemed trivial, but was surprising in how dif-
ficult it was to achieve with what was available. To give credit to the difficulty
of the problem, it must be considered how much happens in 2 years with regards
to attack vectors, internet use trends, and the experimental constraints on these
2 academic datasets. Yet, adversarial network models were shown to improve
the representation of latent features in statistically different networking domains
for purposes of DoS triage. The semisupervised adversarial network performed
better than baseline, and also an established transfer learning method, CORAL.
Although this study was limited in scope by data availability we wish to dis-
cuss how this general approach is not be limited to net-flow like records nor triage
tasks. Adversarial neural networks are a general machine learning approach
which can be tailored to many applications. However, this work also describes
difficulties associated with model tuning and reproducibility of even the simple
adversarial neural network topology used. Although this work presents useful
training criteria for tuning these models in a semisupervised setting, consider-
able research can be done to make the training of these models more reliable,
and their evaluation less manual. We plan to address some of these issues in
future work, but readily invite other researchers to contribute in this field. For
global understanding of cyber threats, both generic and distributable represen-
tations / understandings must be obtained. If a threat is known by a detector
on the public internet, it should be transferable on a private network detectors.
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